God and the Moral Order by Layman, C. Stephen
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 19 Issue 3 Article 3 
7-1-2002 
God and the Moral Order 
C. Stephen Layman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Layman, C. Stephen (2002) "God and the Moral Order," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 19 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol19/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER 
C. Stephen Layman 
I argue that three theses about the moral order are defensible, that they do not 
beg the question of God's existence, and that they support theism over natu-
ralism. The three theses are: 
1. In every actual case, one has most reason to do what is morally 
required. (One has most reason to do act x if and only if the strongest 
relevant reasons favor doing x.) 
2. If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which 
morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively 
modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms). 
3. If in a given situation one must make a great sacrifice in order to do 
what is morally required, but the sacrifice confers relatively modest 
benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms), then one does not have 
most reason to do what is morally required. 
("Sacrifice" is here used in a technical way to indicate a permanent and 
uncompensated loss of something that is in the agent's long-term best inter-
ests.) After arguing for these three theses, I claim that since theism can accom-
modate them and naturalism cannot, theism has a theoretical advantage over 
naturalism. 
Skepticism about the value of moral arguments for theism is widespread 
among philosophers. But I maintain that there is a conjunction of theses 
about the moral order that increases the probability of theism. None of 
these theses begs the question of God's existence and each is, I believe, 
plausible upon reflection. 
Prior to stating my argument, a number of preliminaries are in order. 
First, in this paper "God" means "an almighty and wholly good being." By 
"theism" I mean simply the view that God exists. I assume that a wholly 
good being is perfectly loving. I also assume that God would not order 
reality in such a way that being moral would disadvantage agents in the 
long run. And I assume that "the long term" likely involves life after death, 
given theism. 1 
Second, I do not think the moral argument I am advancing can stand 
alone. Hence, in putting it forward, I assume either that other theistic argu-
ments provide some significant support for the existence of God or that 
belief in God is properly basic. 2 Thus, I claim merely that my moral argu-
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ment makes a positive contribution to a larger, rational case for (or defense 
of) theism. 
Third, the argument I wish to advance is primarily an attempt to show 
that a certain body of evidence supports theism over naturalism. By "natu-
ralism" I mean roughly the view that (a) whatever exists is material or 
dependent (causally or by supervenience) on material things and (b) mate-
rial things are entirely governed by natural laws. There is no God accord-
ing to the naturalist and no life after death. When we die, our bodies decay, 
and we cease to exist. 
Fourth, my argument is designed to appeal to those who believe that 
there are irreducibly moral facts. I assume, for example, that it is a moral 
fact that it is wrong to torture people for fun. Some individuals or groups may 
deny or ignore this fact, but it remains a fact. (Analogously, it is fact that 
the earth is round, and this remains a fact even though it is denied by the 
Flat Earth Society.) In saying that there are irreducibly moral facts, I mean 
that the facts in question cannot correctly be identified with non-evaluative 
or non-normative facts, such as merely psychological or sociological facts. 
To illustrate, the fact that murder is wrong cannot be identified with the fact 
that most humans disapprove of murder. 3 
Fifth, my argument is meant to appeal to those who accept a fairly tradi-
tional understanding of what is morally right and wrong. I shall simply 
assume, for example, that lying, stealing, and killing are generally wrong, 
though I shall not beg any questions about cases commonly regarded as 
allowable exceptions. For instance, I shall assume that it is generally wrong 
to intentionally kill a human being, but I shall not beg any questions about 
the usual range of possible exceptions, e.g., killing in self-defense. Of 
course, some moral theorists reject what I here call a "fairly traditional 
understanding of what is right and wrong." To illustrate, some act-utilitari-
ans find killing, stealing, and lying permissible in many situations in which 
these acts are traditionally considered wrong. In my opinion, ethical theo-
ries that justify killing, stealing, and lying in a much wider range of cases 
than is traditionally allowed are, for that very reason, highly problematic; 
but I shall not argue that case here. I can only say that those who reject a 
fairly traditional view about the wrongness of killing, stealing, and lying 
need read no further, for this paper is unlikely to be of any interest to them. 
Sixth, in this paper, locutions such as "This is a moral duty" or "This is a 
moral requirement" express not merely prima facie moral duties but ultima 
facie moral duties. That is, when I say that an act is a moral duty (or that it 
is morally required), I mean that, in the situation in question, the act is 
what one morally ought to do all things considered. For example, if I say that 
one is morally required not to steal in a certain situation, I do not mean sim-
ply that there are some moral considerations against stealing that may be 
outweighed by other moral considerations in favor of stealing; rather I 
mean that, taking all morally relevant factors into account, one ought not 
to steal in that situation. 
Seventh, I shall frequently use the locution "x has most reason to do y." 
A person has "most reason" to do something, in my sense, when the 
weightiest or strongest reasons favor doing that thing. So, if an agent has 
most reason to do act A, then taking all relevant reasons into account (e.g., 
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prudential, moral, and aesthetic reasons), they on balance favor perform-
ing A. And I assume that "the balance of reasons" is not a merely subjec-
tive notion; agents can make mistakes in weighing up reasons for and 
against an action. For example, in my view, a person who thinks that moral 
requirements are typically outweighed by personal whims would be mak-
ing a grave mistake. 
Finally, I shall use the word "sacrifice" in a somewhat technical way to 
indicate a permanent, net loss of something that is in the long-term best interests 
of the agent. So, for present purposes, the word "sacrifice" indicates a per-
manent loss to the agent, not a temporary one; moreover, it indicates a loss 
that is not "made up for" in the long nill. Of course, as the term is ordinari-
ly used, sacrifices are often temporary and/ or compensated, so let me pro-
vide some examples of a sacrifice in my sense. Suppose, for the sake of 
illustration, that there is no life after death, and hence that this earthly life 
is the only one we've got. On this supposition, if one gave up one's eye-
sight permanently and this loss was not compensated in any way, then one 
would have made a sacrifice in my sense of the term, indeed a great sacri-
fice. Similarly, if a person who is not poor were to give up all of her materi-
al goods, and this loss was not compensated in any way, she would have 
made a sacrifice in my sense of the term, presumably a great one. 
1. The Argument Briefly Stated 
In this section I will state my argument. My intent is to summarize the 
basic intuitions that give the argument its plausibility. In the next section I 
will consider some important objections to the argument and amplify some 
key points. 
My argument has three main premises. 4 Premise (1) is this: In every actu-
al case one has most reason to do what is morally required. In other words, in 
every actual case, if a person is morally required to do some act, then (tak-
ing all relevant reasons into account) the balance of reasons favors per-
forming that act. Why think (1) is true? Consider an actual case in which 
someone has performed an action that you initially find quite puzzling or 
odd. Then imagine that you become convinced that in performing the 
action the person was doing his or her moral duty. The act was morally 
required. Would you not assume that the action was fully justified on this 
basis? Most of us would and most moral theorists (theist or non-theist) 
would agree. If an act is my moral duty, then I have overriding reason to 
perform it. In short, premise (1) is part of our pre-theoretical conception of 
morality. And thus, if we take an Aristotelian approach to philosophy, (1) 
is among the appearances to be saved. 
We can, however, say a bit more in favor of (1): If one does not always 
have most reason to do what is morally required, then why should one be 
moral? In a given case, considerations of prudence, aesthetics, and/ or eti-
quette may conflict with moral considerations and one faces the question, 
"How should one act?", where the "should" is not moral but may be inter-
preted along the following lines: "Which alternative course of action is 
backed by the strongest or weightiest reasons?" And if we grant that a cer-
tain course of action X is backed by the strongest or weightiest reasons, 
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then from a rational point of view X should be done. Moreover, if we agree 
that the best reasons sometimes favor immoral actions, and yet we give our 
full allegiance to morality, then our allegiance to morality is irrational in 
the sense that it involves acting on inferior reasons. But I presume that 
most of my readers give morality their full allegiance and do not regard 
this allegiance as involving such irrationality. So, I assume that my readers 
will find themselves strongly inclined to accept (1). 
Before going on, however, I should point out that premise (1) is not the 
claim that one has most reason to do what is morally required in every logi-
cally possible case. In other words, I have not claimed that (1) is a necessary 
truth, I have merely claimed that it is true. And I shall soon describe some 
logically possible cases or situations in which it seems to me that the agent 
would not have most reason to do what is morally required. I regard these 
cases as merely logically possible-I myself do not think that cases combin-
ing all of the relevant features occur in the actual world. However, those 
who are convinced that there is no God and no life after death may be 
inclined to regard cases of the relevant type as actual, and this may raise 
questions about premise (1). I shall return to this matter in section II, but 
for now I will simply make three assertions: (a) since we are discussing an 
argument for God's existence, I take it that the non-existence of God is not 
properly assumed in evaluating the truth of my premises, (b) I hope to 
show that each of my three main premises is either embedded in our pre-
theoretical conception of morality or defensible via argument (or both), 
and (c) my overall strategy is to argue that theism has a theoretical advan-
tage over naturalism because theism can accommodate my three main 
premises while naturalism cannot. 
Premise (2) is as follows: If there is no God and no life after death, then there 
are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers rel-
atively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms). The following 
case-let us call it the "Ms. Poore case" -is offered in support of premise 
(2). Suppose Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is 
not starving, but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to 
get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportu-
nity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and 
invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has 
denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-bal-
anced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, 
new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals 
the money, her chances of being caught are very low and she knows this. 
She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and 
will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rational-
ly believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty 
for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing 
the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I 
think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, 
assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money 
will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfillment, Le., a large 
measure of what is in her long-term best interests. 5 
I believe that the Ms. Poore case offers intuitive support for premise (2). 
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However, some may reject (2) on the grounds that virtue is its own reward, 
and hence we are necessarily compensated for our morally required losses 
because moral virtue is a great enough benefit to those who possess it to 
compensate fully for any losses it entails. Now, I do not doubt that virtue is 
a benefit to those who possess it. But the suggestion that perfect virtue is nec-
essarilya great enough benefit to its possessor to compensate fully for any 
loss it entails strikes me as highly implausible. Consider the following 
thought experiment. 6 Imagine two people, Mr. Gladwin and Ms. Goodwin. 
Mr. Gladwin is a morally lukewarm person who happens to be regarded as 
a paragon of virtue. He is admired by most people, prosperous, loved by 
his family and friends, and enjoys his life very much. Ms. Goodwin on the 
other hand is genuinely virtuous-honest, just, and pure in heart. 
Unfortunately, because of some clever enemies, Ms. Goodwin is widely 
regarded as wicked. She is in prison for life on false charges. Her family and 
friends, convinced that she is guilty, have turned against her. She subsists 
on a bread and water diet. Leaving God out of the picture for the moment, 
which of these two people is better off? Which is more fulfilled assuming 
there is no God? Surely it is Gladwin, not Goodwin. And note that even if 
virtue is of value for its own sake, it isn't the only thing of value. 7 In particu-
lar, freedom is valuable too. Suppose the warden agrees to release Ms. 
Goodwin if and only if she commits one morally wrong act. Perhaps her 
accounting skills enable her to help steal some money for the warden. Now, 
it seems to me that if there is no God and no life after death, it could easily 
be in Ms. Goodwin's long-term best interest to act immorally in this sort of 
case. The choice is roughly between life-long misery and an action that is 
immoral but produces relatively modest harms. So, it does not seem neces-
sarily true that the rewards of perfect virtue compensate for the rewards of 
wrongdoing; nor does it seem necessarily true that being perfectly virtuous is 
in the agent's long-term best interest. I conclude that the cases of Ms. Poore 
and Ms. Goodwin provide strong intuitive support for (2). 
The above cases also help to support premise (3): If in a given case one 
must make a great sacrifice in order to do what is morally required, but the sacri-
fice confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms), then 
one does not have most reason to do what is morally required. Further support 
for this third premise comes from the following principle: It is always and 
necessarily prudent to act so as to promote one's long-term best interests. And 
therefore, making a great sacrifice (where a sacrifice is an uncompensated 
giving-up of something that is in one's long-term best interests) is not pru-
dent. Premise (3) makes explicit what the cases of Ms. Poore and Ms. 
Goodwin strongly suggest, namely, that when considerations of prudence and 
morality clash, if the prudential considerations are truly momentous while the 
results of behaving immorally are relatively minor, then morality does not override 
prudence. 
There are, I recognize, multiple barriers to the acceptance of (3). I shall 
make two brief comments here and leave more technical issues for the next 
section. First, it may be helpful to note that if God exists, there will be no 
genuine conflicts between prudence and morality. The reason is this: to act 
immorally is to sin; to sin is to alienate oneself from God; and it is never in 
one's long-term best interests to alienate oneself from God. Accordingly, 
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the situation envisioned in the antecedent of premise (3) could not be actu-
al if God exists, for in doing one's moral duty one prevents a very great 
harm to oneself, namely, alienation from God. 
Second, it might be claimed that (a) acting immorally even just once will 
ruin one's character and (b) to ruin one's character is to incur a great loss; 
hence, one always has most reason to act morally. The problem with this 
objection to premise (3) is that (a) is manifestly false. For one's character 
can be summed up in terms of traits (e.g., being fair, being responsible, 
being wise, being loving, etc.), each trait being a tendency to act in a certain 
way. But many or even most people can do something wrong in what they 
regard as a rare special case without thereby altering significantly the basic 
behavioral tendencies associated with their traits of character. 8 
We have, then, three premises, each of which is plausible on reflection 
and none of which begs the question of God's existence. Let us now exam-
ine the logic of the situation: 
Premise 1. In every actual case, one has most reason to do what is 
morally required. 
Premise 2. If there is no God and no life after death, then there are 
cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that 
confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest 
harms). 
Premise 3. If in a given case one must make a great sacrifice in order 
to do what is morally required, but the sacrifice confers relatively 
modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms), then one does 
not have most reason to do what is morally required. 
Premises (2) and (3) imply the following sub-conclusion: 
4. If there is no God and no life after death, then in some cases one 
does not have most reason to do what is morally required. 
But (4) and (1) combine to yield: 
5. "There is no God and no life after death" is false, i.e., either God 
exists or there is life after death (or both). 
Given (5), one can still avoid the conclusion that God exists by arguing that 
there would be (or at least might well be) a life after death in which the best 
interests of morally virtuous persons are realized even if God does not exist. 
This move is not, however, open to the naturalist. So, let us consider some 
objections that, if correct, would prevent us from arriving at step (5). 
II. Objections and Replies 
Objection 1. Your argument presupposes that, on pain of irrationality, one 
needs some non-moral or prudential reason to do what is morally 
required; but this presupposition is false. In fact, to be genuinely morally 
virtuous, one must do the morally right thing simply because it is right. 
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Those who do the right thing for an ulterior, prudential reason are, from a 
moral point of view, substandard. 
Reply. My argument does not involve this presupposition. Granted, 
from the moral standpoint, one should do the right thing for moral rea-
sons. But what if there are possible situations in which the weightiest rea-
sons favor doing something besides what's morally required? On the 
assumption that agents can find themselves in such situations, it would 
seem that agents are rationally justified in doing something other than 
what's morally required. So, I'm not suggesting people should behave 
morally for ulterior motives, I'm raising the question whether they 
"should" behave morally at all in certain hypothetical situations. (The 
"should" in scare quotes does not express the dictates of morality, but the 
dictates of rationality, i.e., what one should do is what one has the weighti-
est reasons to do). Let me elaborate briefly. 
Assuming that conflicts between morality and prudence occur, I agree 
that moral reasons can outweigh prudential ones. For example, suppose 
ten children will die a very painful death if I don't help them, but helping 
them will produce a very slight net decrease in the satisfaction of my long-
term best interests. Such cases are not actual, in my view, but if they do 
occur, then it seems clear to me that the moral reasons would outweigh the 
conflicting prudential ones. And so, in such cases, I would have most rea-
son to act morally even though prudence runs contrary to morality. 
What I question is the rationality of doing what's morally required if the 
gains (for all affected) are relatively minor and the long-term disadvantages 
to the agent are momentous. In such hypothetical cases it seems to me that 
the strongest reasons do not back morality. Thus, my argument draws 
attention to the fact that certain metaphysical views are demoralizing, in the 
sense that they make acting on weaker reasons the price of moral virtue in 
some instances. It may be useful to illustrate this point with a rather far-
fetched metaphysical view: Suppose a very powerful Deity is in control of 
the universe but the Deity particularly delights in ensuring that those who 
do their duty for duty's sake fare very poorly as compared to the self-serv-
ing phonies, the morally lukewarm, and the wicked. And suppose the free 
agents are well aware of these grim metaphysical facts. In such a situation it 
seems to me that the free agents would often lack overriding reason to do 
their moral duty. Again, my point is not that people should do the right 
things to get a reward; rather, my point is that in certain hypothetical situa-
tions people lack overriding reason to do the right thing. 
Objection 2. The cases you describe in support of premises (2) and (3) are 
bound to be taken by the naturalist as evidence against premise (1). Also, 
by attacking or qualifying the thesis that virtue is its OWIl reward, you have 
undermined the only ground a naturalist has for accepting (1). Thus, 
although your premises may be logically consistent, your argument is 
dialectically flawed; in effect you give the naturalist good reason to reject 
premise (1). 9 
Reply. First of all, my moral cases (i.e., Ms. Poore, Ms. Goodwin) provide 
evidence against premise (1) only on the assumption that there is no God 
and no life after death. But one can hardly make this assumption and give 
the argument an open-minded run for its money; it is after all an argument 
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for God's existence! So, if the naturalist regards my moral cases as evidence 
against (1), the naturalist is begging the question, and the dialectical error 
is on the naturalist's side. 
Second, I doubt that many people accept (1) on the grounds that virtue is 
its own reward. I doubt that (1) is typically accepted on the basis of an argu-
ment at all. Rather, when certain questions are posed, we simply find that 
we are presupposing (1). To illustrate, consider an (admittedly contrived) 
moral theory: one is always morally required to do what is best for others. 10 On 
this theory, the agent's interests are irrelevant to morality-the agent must 
do what is best for others regardless of the cost to himself. But suppose a 
significant sacrifice on my part would only marginally improve someone 
else's lot, e.g., Sue's minor headache can somehow be relieved if I give up 
my annual two-week vacation. This moral theory seems to demand that I 
give up my vacation. Well, why not accept this theory of morality? One 
good reason seems to be this: it fails to give self-interest its due, and thus 
yields a situation in which alleged moral requirements are overridden by 
self-interest. The point, of course, is not that self-interest does override 
morality, but rather that the overridingness of moral reasons is presup-
posed in our moral theorizing. And of course, we bring this presupposition 
to our moral theorizing because it is deeply embedded in our pre-theoreti-
cal conception of morality. II 
Third, the appeal to virtue is its own reward is not the only possible 
defense of premise (1). As noted previously, if (1) is false, then immoral 
actions are sometimes backed by reasons as strong as (or stronger than) 
those backing the moral alternative. But if immoral actions are sometimes 
backed by reasons as strong as (or stronger than) those backing the moral 
alternative, then the institution of morality lacks rational authority. That is, 
the system of morality does not a have blanket endorsement from the ratio-
nal point of view--only parts of it do. And even if those parts are very 
large, this consequence is not something most of us can readily accept. 
Objection 3. Some moral theorists, in company with Kant and R.M. Hare, 
claim that moral reasons necessarily or by definition override all others. 12 If 
such views are correct, then premise (3) must be false. For if moral reasons 
necessarily override all other kinds of reasons, then there can be no situa-
tion in which one lacks most reason to act morally; but (3) presupposes 
that such situations are possible. 
Reply. No dictionary defines "morality" in terms of overridingness. So, 
those who define moral reasons as overriding ones are offering a theory and 
we need evidence for the theory. Similarly, the claim that moral reasons 
necessarily override all others is not obvious, and it won't do to argue for it 
in an inductive fashion by citing cases. The problem with such an inductive 
approach is that it runs afoul of the very sorts of cases that serve as the 
focus of this paper. The hypothetical cases described in section I cast doubt 
on the claim that "It is necessarily true that moral reasons are overriding." 
So, the situation seems to be that most of us find ourselves believing that, 
in every actual case, moral reasons are overriding; but-unless we take for 
granted certain highly controversial metaphysical theses (see the response 
to objection 5 below)-we lack good reason to think that "Moral reasons 
are overriding" is a necessary truth. 
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Objection 4. Kantians argue that whenever an agent acts immorally, she acts 
on a maxim that she cannot consistently will to be universal law. But it is irra-
tional to act on a maxim one cannot consistently will to be universal law; 
hence, one always has most reason to act morally; therefore, premise (3) is 
false. 
Reply. My reply is twofold. First, the Kantian thesis is in fact highly 
dubious. Consider the case of Ms. Poore. How should we describe the 
maxim she is acting on? Presumably along the following lines: Whenever I 
find myself in a circumstance in which (a) I am very poor but not destitute, (b) I 
can easily steal a large sum of money with impunity from a very rich person, (c) 1 
will doom myself to enduring and wretched poverty by not stealing, and (d) 1 will 
inflict little harm by stealing, I shall steal. Why can't Ms. Poore consistently 
will this maxim to be universal law? The clauses of the maxim ensure that 
it can be applied only rarely. And I see no conceptual difficulties regarding 
theft (or the institution of private property) if we contemplate a world 
(similar to the actual world but) in which all relevantly situated persons act 
in accord with the maxim. And although Ms. Poore might not like to have 
money stolen from her if she were rich, she might nevertheless be willing to 
have anyone in her current circumstances act in accord with the stated 
maxim, and willing to take a chance on being stolen from in the event that 
she herself should become rich. Perhaps a few Kantians (certainly not Kant 
himself) will agree with all this and adopt a revisionist morality that allows 
stealing (lying, etc.) in the cases I've described. But since such revisionism 
runs contrary to my settled judgment of the cases, I do not think it pro-
vides the naturalist with a cost-free response to my argument. 
Second, suppose we grant that if one acts immorally, one acts on a maxim 
one cannot consistently will to be universal law. Does it follow logically that 
one has most reason to be moral? Not clearly. For one may have very 
strong reasons to make a special exception in one's own case. And even if 
making a special exception in one's own case is always immoral, it may 
sometimes be rational. 13 One can imagine Ms. Poore saying, "Even if I can-
not consistently will that all possible agents in my situation commit theft, 
the fact is relatively few people will ever be in my situation and in this case 
there's just too much at stake for me personally in doing the moral thing." 
Objection 5. Not only naturalists but many theists must reject your argu-
ment, namely, those theists, very common in the Christian tradition, who 
hold that God exists necessarily, is necessarily perfectly morally good, and is 
necessarily omnipotent. Let us call these theists "classical theists." According 
to classical theists, it is not logically possible for there to be a situation in 
which an agent makes a great sacrifice (which involves a permanent and 
uncompensated loss of something in the agent's long-term best interests) in 
order to do something morally required. For a perfectly good and omnipo-
tent Deity would not set up a moral order in which doing one's duty is con-
trary to one's long-term best interests. Moreover, such a Deity exists in every 
possible world and is perfectly good and omnipotent in every possible 
world, according to the classical theist. Hence, your argument countenances 
situations that are simply not possible according to the classical theist. 
Reply. First, since I am arguing for God's existence, it would hardly be 
dialogically appropriate for me to begin by assuming that God cannot fail 
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to exist. Moreover, the classical theist herself can grant the possibility that 
God doesn't exist for the sake of the argument. So, I don't think my argumen-
tative strategy is necessarily in conflict with classical theism. 
Second, the classical theist should accept all three of my premises: 
Premise (2) obviously has an impossible antecedent given classical theism 
("If there is no God ... "). Hence, by a familiar principle of modal logic, 
classical theists should regard (2) as a necessary truth. Premise (3) is also 
necessarily true given classical theism, for reasons alluded to in objection 5: 
A perfectly good God would never set up a moral order in which doing 
one's duty is contrary to one's long-term best interests and such a God 
exists in every possible world, according to the classical theist. Hence, the 
situation envisaged in the antecedent of (3) is impossible, and (3) itself is 
necessary. Finally, classical theists should accept premise (1), but deny my 
claim that (1) is contingent. Since immoral behavior is sin, sin alienates one 
from God, and alienation from God undermines personal fulfillment, I pre-
sume prudence never trumps morality if God exists. Hence, one always 
has most reason to act morally, if God exists. Moreover, God exists in every 
possible world according to the classical theist (and is both perfectly good 
and omnipotent in every possible world). Of course, this way of arguing 
for the necessity of premise (1) is not available to the naturalist or indeed to 
any type of non-theist. 
III. Completing the Argument 
If my argument up to this point is any good, then it has given some support 
to step (5), i.e., the thesis that either God exists or there is life after death (or 
both). However, (5) could be true even if God does not exist; for it may be 
that there is no God but there is a life after death in which the best interests 
of the morally virtuous are realized. So, in this section I wish to complete 
my moral argument for theism by defending the following premise: 
6. It is likely that if there is a life after death in which the long-term 
best interests of the morally virtuous are realized, then God exists. 
If premise (6) is defensible, then if it is conjoined with premises (1) through 
(3), we have an argument that lends positive support to theism. In defend-
ing (6), I shall rely on two assumptions. First, I shall assume that there is no 
life after death given naturalism. Second, I shall assume that the two best 
theories of the afterlife centrally involve either theism or reincarnation. 
Given that reincarnation occurs, each person's soul is transferred to 
another body at some time after death. So, given reincarnation, there is life 
after death. And given the doctrine of karma, one's degree of moral virtue 
determines one's circumstances in the next life. Indeed, if the law of 
karma governs the universe, the more nearly one lives up to the demands 
of morality, the better one's circumstances in the next life. 14Thus, the tra-
ditional Hindu doctrines of reincarnation and karma combine to yield a 
cosmic moral order. 
Of course, a doctrine of reincarnation could be combined with theism, 
but we are here concerned with versions of reincarnation that are in logical 
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competition with theism, i.e., views that deny the existence of any sort of 
personal Deity. And it seems to me that such views are self-undermining, 
for the complexity of the moral order they postulate provides good evi-
dence of an Intelligent and Moral Designer. Consider: given that reincarna-
tion and karma hold in the absence of any Deity, the universe is governed 
not only by physical laws but by impersonal moral laws. These moral laws 
must be very complicated, for they have to regulate the connection 
between each soul's moral record in one life and that soul's total circum-
stances in its next life, including which body it has and the degree of hap-
piness (and/ or misery) it experiences. Accordingly, these laws must some-
how take into account every act, every intention, and every choice of every 
moral agent and ensure that the agent receives nothing less than his or her 
just deserts in the next life. Now, the degree of complexity involved here is 
not only extraordinarily high, it is also complexity that serves a moral end, 
namely, justice. Such complexity can hardly be accepted as a brute fact. 
Highly complex order serving a moral end is a phenomenon that legitimates 
appeal to an intelligent cause. And if the order is on a scale far surpassing 
what can reasonably be attributed to human intelligence, the appeal to 
divine intelligence is surely justified. Thus, the moral order postulated by 
non-theistic reincarnation provides evidence for theism. 15 
To sum up, even if reincarnation occurs in accordance with the principle 
of karma, the nature of the postulated moral order lends support to theism. 
Therefore, it seems likely that if there is a life after death in which the ulti-
mate fulfillment of the morally virtuous is realized, then God exists. And 
this thesis, together with the argument of section I, provides at least some 
positive support for the proposition that God exists. 1(, 
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NOTES 
1. Here is a sketch of an argument linking theism and life after death: A 
wholly loving God would care deeply about the fulfillment of human creatures 
and would not leave human creatures frustrated and unfulfilled if he is able to 
provide the means of fulfillment. Yet, as virtually everyone will admit, in this 
earthly life, the deepest yearnings of human beings are not fulfilled, and many 
human beings have led lives characterized by frustration. An almighty God is 
surely able to provide the means of fulfillment by providing human creatures 
with a form of existence after death in which their deepest yearnings can be 
satisfied. So, if God exists, life after death seems likely. 
2. A belief is properly basic if it does not need to be based on other beliefs in 
order to be rational or warranted. Note that, even if belief in God is properly 
basic, arguments for God's existence are not necessarily rendered pointless; for 
even when a proposition is already known or rationally believed, independent 
lines of support can still have a significant confirming role. For a defense of the 
thesis that belief in God can be properly basic, see Alvin Plantinga, "Reason 
and Belief in God," in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith 
and Rationality (New York: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 16-93 and 
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 167-198. 
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3. Though I shall not discuss the issue in this paper, I believe that severe 
problems result from the denial of moral facts. See David Brink, "Moral 
Realism and the Sceptical Argument from Disagreement and Queerness" 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984): 111-125. This article is anthologized 
in Louis Pojman, ed., Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, second 
edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995),469-476. For a well-known rejection 
of moral facts, see J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1977), 15-49. I should also note that my assumption that moral 
facts cannot be identified with non-evaluative (or non-normative) facts is 
incompatible with certain (I think rather extreme) versions of the divine com-
mand theory, e.g., versions claiming that moral wrongness is identical with being 
forbidden by an all powerful being. On the other hand, my assumption is compati-
ble with divine command theories that identify moral wrongness with being for-
bidden by a morally good or loving Deity. 
4. My premises are partly inspired by a quartet of theses discussed in 
David O. Brink, "A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality," ed. 
James E. Tomberlin, Philosophical Perspectives, 6 Ethics, 1992 (Atascadero, CA: 
Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1992), 1-26. 
5. In discussing this case with various philosophers, I have found that cer-
tain ways of elaborating the case make it more convincing to some. (A) For 
example, to some it might make a difference if Ms. Poore steals the money part-
ly to emich the lives of her children (e.g., by providing them with better cloth-
ing, food they enjoy, etc). I welcome such elaborations, but with this proviso: it 
is essential that the elaborations not be such as to give Ms. Poore a moral duty 
that plausibly overrides her duty not to steal. For example, if she steals the 
money to pay for expensive surgery needed to save the life of one of her chil-
dren, it would be at least plausible to suppose that her duty to preserve life 
overrides her duty not to steal. I have presented the case simply as one in which 
momentous prudential concerns compete with the moral duty not to steal. (B) Details 
about Ms. Poore's emotional life can make a difference in how one responds to 
the case. For example, if she is going to be wracked with literally unending and 
intense guilt for stealing the money, then it presumably is not to her advantage 
to steal it. But there is no need to suppose that Ms. Poore has this type of sensi-
tivity. We may imagine her to be a person who is clear-headed, who realizes 
that she is in a very special sort of moral situation, and who is not going to 
berate herself for performing the action that is backed by the strongest reasons. 
6. This thought experiment is borrowed in its essentials from Richard 
Taylor, "Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong," in Louis Pojman, ed., 
Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth, 1989), 115-121. For some interesting, brief reflections on the diffi-
culty of showing that it is in everyone's best interest to be virtuous, see Bernard 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 43-45. Also see, Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 201-220. 
7. Thus I leave open the disputed question whether the virtues are good 
merely as means to an end, e.g., that being fair is not good for its own sake, but 
good as a means to harmonious and rewarding relationships with others. 
8. For an interesting set of reflections confirming the main point of this 
paragraph, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 102-103. ("You may know that if you 
always did this sort of thing your identity would disintegrate, ... , but you also 
know that you can do it just this once without any such result," p. 102.) 
9. I am indebted to Eleonore Stump for helping me to phrase this objec-
tion in a clear fashion. 
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10. The example is borrowed from Sarah Stroud, "Moral Overridingness 
and Moral Theory," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998), 170-189. 
11. Here perhaps is the place to note that some ethicists have rejected the 
thesis that moral requirements always override all other considerations. See, 
for example, Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" in Virtues 
and Vices (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 
181-188. The argumentation in Foot's essay seems to me unconvincing, howev-
er. For example, Foot points out that people who care about morality will 
sometimes say things of this sort, "It was morally wrong to do X but 1 had to do 
X to avoid disaster for myself, my family, or my country." But it seems to me 
that this sort of statement does not prove even that the speaker believes that 
the moral reasons are overridden by other reasons. After all, a smoker may say, 
"I know that the best and strongest reasons favor not smoking, but I had to light 
up anyway." Notoriously, we humans often feel we "have to" do things that 
are backed by inferior reasons. 
12. For a helpful discussion of conceptions of morality and overridingness, 
see Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989),9-33. 
13. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives/, in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays ill Moral Philosophy (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 157-173. 
14. According to traditional Hindu thought, if one is perfectly morat one 
deserves moksha (salvation), i.e., deliverance from samsara (the cycle of birth 
and death). This deliverance is generally equated with a kind of oneness with 
ultimate reality. 
15. The main point of this paragraph is borrowed from Robin Collins, 
"Eastern Religions," in Michael J. Murray, ed., Reason for the Hope Within 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 206. 
16. 1 wish to thank Terence Cuneo, Jeanine Diller, Paul Draper, Evan Fales, 
Peter Forrest, Douglas Geivett, Phillip Goggans, Kenneth Einar Himma, Daniel 
Howard-Snyder, Robert Koons, Mark Murphy, Stephen Porter, and Eleonore 
Stump for thoughtful comments on various earlier drafts of this paper. 
